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Lebanon’s ‘Arab Spring’: 
Exploring Identity, Security, And Change 
 
Dima Smayra 
 
The Backdrop 
The Arab uprisings were received with enthusiasm, support and optimism across the whole 
spectrum of the Lebanese political leadership and society. Many even went so far as to say that 
the ‘Arab spring’ originated and was inspired by the 2005 Lebanese ‘Independence Uprising’ 
which successfully ended a 30-year Syrian occupation.1 Nevertheless, even in the earlier stages, 
voices of concern over minority issues were heard.2 While Lebanon had long been the centre 
of attention, it seemed to be watching the events sweeping across the region from afar. Was 
Lebanon to glide through the regional instability? And, was Lebanon not to have its own radical 
Spring? Different media outlets hypothesised as to why Lebanon seemed to be unaffected by 
the regional events. Ultimately, however, a ripple effect from the regional instability slowly built 
up and challenged the initial enthusiasm.  
As the uprisings reached Syria, anxiety soon took over the political rhetoric in Lebanon. The 
uneasy relationship that binds these two countries would aggravate an already precarious 
situation. The two leading political blocks in Lebanon had been in a stand-off since 2005.  
Simply put, Lebanon has been at a crossroads, and the direction forward has been fiercely 
fought over. As regional showdowns continue to be vividly mirrored in Lebanese politics, the 
Syrian events were seen as the perfect opportunity for the two leading blocks to entrench their 
positions and escalate their mobilisation.  
Repercussions of the regional situation were felt in Lebanon when the uprisings appeared to 
take over Syria; this paper, therefore, focuses on the impact of the Syrian events over Lebanese 
politics and security. In doing so, it highlights the mobilising effect of sectarian identities and 
the intricate relationship between identity and security. In addition, drawing on ‘critical security 
studies’ school, this study attempts to suggest a more comprehensive approach to 
reconstructing a common identity, but remains cautious about its prospects. 
 
The Background 
The 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri had seismic effects on a long-
stagnant domestic political scene. Armed with international support, Lebanese people marched 
the streets in protest at the prolonged Syrian presence.  What was then dubbed the ‘Beirut 
Spring’ was soon met with counter-demonstrations in support and recognition of the stabilising 
Syrian role and in rejection of Western influence. This created a schism in Lebanese society 
and gave birth to what would become known as the March 14th and the March 8th blocks. The 
Lebanese political scene has since been deeply polarised. This polarisation has had important 
socio-economic, political and hard security effects; these have manifested themselves though 
one stalemate after another, government paralysis, politicisation of every aspect of the public 
sector, and unresolved remnants of war and of 30 years of Syrian presence, such as weak public 
institutions and security services. Meanwhile, justice and development have slipped further 
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down the priority list, armed clashes or security incidents have maintained a relatively steady 
presence in everyday life, and the whole public service seems to have been put on hold.3  
In the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal, several ‘historical’ and long overdue reconciliations 
necessary in war-to-peace transitions took place. 4  The ‘Independence Uprising’ brought 
together an unlikely alliance between Hariri, Gemayel, Geagea, Jumblat, and for a brief period 
of time Michel Aoun.5 These individuals are historical giants of Lebanon’s political landscape. 
For many Lebanese, it finally seemed that the civil war was behind them. Moreover, in spite of 
the rift with other factions, the 2006 ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between Hezbollah and 
the Free Patriotic Movement was another important step in this direction. Christian 
representation in both camps meant that the divide was no longer between Christians and 
Muslims as clearly as it had been in the case of the civil war; the tension was more visible in 
Shia-Sunni relations.6 However, that is not to say that the Arab uprisings did not spur old threat 
perceptions.7 The dividing lines were merely redrawn between two divergent political paths: 
those of March 14th and March 8th.8 That being said, the concerns, representation and the 
mobilisation remained largely sectarian.  
By examining the different Lebanese reactions to the ‘Arab spring’, this paper highlights 
endemic attitudes and fears which have prevented a break from traditional politics. Traditional 
politics in Lebanon have focused on sectarian identities and, sectarianism had long been 
institutionalised – under the Ottoman Empire, the French Mandate and since independence. 
Security, for each of the communities, has been equivalent to a zero-sum game. Securing 
sectarian identity continues to be the main referent. 9 However, since 2005, the reconfiguration 
of power conceded to alliances which recognised the dynamic between interests and identities. 
It has been argued that “identity and interests (…) are dynamically interrelated” and “cause each 
other”;10 these new alliances illustrate this argument, as the rallying of different sectarian groups 
with some and against others consequently created new umbrella identities – March 14th and 8th.  
Sectarianism and Identi ty in the Lebanese System 
George Corm writes of a ‘torn identity’;11 Hassan Krayem notes that “polarization among the 
Lebanese and their efforts to defend or promote their interests invited and facilitated external 
intervention”. 12  Allegiances and identities in Lebanon have not been bound by territorial 
borders.13 Throughout the years, it has required the intervention of the same foreign powers 
that supported the crisis in the first place, in order to put the “Lebanese ‘Humpty Dumpty’ 
back together”.14 The different sects have required outside powers to support their position in 
the distribution of power, and have survived as extensions of larger regional and international 
forces. 15  Since 2005 the cards have been reshuffled; as Lebanon is ‘in the middle of a 
showdown’ between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and most of the international community 
on the other hand,16 these unlikely alliances changed the face of the power composition – giving 
way to a more complex and diverse one. That is not to say that sectarianism is withering; Karim 
Knio speaks of neo-sectarianism where “it is clear that ‘old/new’ cleavages that characterise 
Lebanese politics is omnipresent”.17 Fawaz Gerges, however, disagrees with the one-layered 
depiction of Lebanese politics. He notes that “far from being sectarian-based or driven, the 
power struggle in Lebanon is multi-layered and complex. Sectarianism is used and abused to 
mask vested interests and differences”.18 Nizar Abdel-Kader also underscores the complexity of 
the Lebanese system, but he reminds us of its duality: feudal and sectarian.19 In any case, 
sectarianism is undoubtedly part of Lebanese politics; as part of identity politics, since 2005, it 
has been fused with new political labels. Therefore, constellations of sectarian identities make 
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up the two main factions struggling over the future of Lebanon: one representing the so-called 
‘axis of moderation’, the other representing the ‘axis of resistance’.  
In her discussion of the ‘New Wars’, Mary Kaldor sheds light on the manipulation of identity 
politics in the conduct of conflicts.20 It is not contentious to note that (sectarian) identity politics 
is an entrenched characteristic of the Lebanese context. And although, within the timeframe of 
this paper, conflict within Lebanon did not escalate into a fully-fledged war, we can appropriate 
Kaldor’s depiction of identity politics to conflict, mobilisation, and political violence in 
Lebanon. According to Kaldor, ‘New Wars’: 
"are fought in the name of identity – a claim to power on the basis of labels. These are 
wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels (…). Labels are 
mobilised for political purposes; they offer a new sense of security (...) They provide a 
new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to maintain or capture power, (…) 
nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments  (…) that is the 
immediate cause of conflict."21  
Violent conflicts based on identity are globalised and unregulated, dependent on “support from 
neighbouring states, diaspora groups”, and not bound by ‘time and space’ or actors. 22 
Therefore, as in the Lebanese case, these are protracted conflicts which revolve around ‘access 
to state power’, and protagonists resort to ‘exclusive identity claims’ in order to mobilise 
supporters based on ‘fear and hate’. Such conflicts are characterised by a “lack of authority of 
the state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing 
to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatisation 
and informalisation of violence”; and these characteristics legitimise the recourse to violence.23 
Furthermore, with regards to the Lebanese context, one may add the failure, as Saoud al-
Mawla notes, of the Lebanese parties to break from the traditional feudo-sectarian system and 
to create a national project.24 Farid Khazen has the same view regarding post-war political 
parties: that is, they contribute to the status quo and fail to provide alternatives to traditional 
politics.25 This opinion has spilled to grass-roots levels; despite the dynamism of Lebanese civil 
society, several groups have lamented that, overwhelmingly, the Lebanese ultimately favour 
sectarian politics.26  
Despite the many years of conflict and the many attempts to patch the domestic ‘mosaic’,27 it is 
not contentious to note that the Lebanese domestic canvas remains incomplete. Pinning this to 
threats to identity is no novelty; nevertheless, this paper examines how the ‘Arab spring’ further 
exacerbates the already precarious stability of Lebanon.  
Perceptions, Representation and Resistance 
There is a long-standing belief that Lebanon is “affected positively or negatively by the regional 
situation”; Interior Minister Marwan Charbel warned that the “repercussions [of the Arab 
spring] will not be easy on Lebanon”.28 March 14th member and head of the Phalange Party 
Amine Gemayel distanced himself from the coalition by stating that “we sympathize with the 
Arab people calling for freedom, but we believe Lebanon should not be involved, other parties’ 
interferences in our affairs affect our country [negatively]”.29 There have been many positions of 
caution regarding the situation in Syria, expressing the idea that any spill over could spiral out 
of control. Charbel reminded both camps to be “aware that we are on the same boat together 
and if the boat sinks all of us will drown”.30 Weakness, orders a political choice, or a security 
measure: the March 8th government has taken several tangible steps to dissociate itself, as it 
claims, from any role in the Syrian crisis.31 The first of these was to abstain from voting for 
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Syrian expulsion from the Arab League, another was the reservations over the Arab League’s 
decision to send a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping mission, and a third was the refusal to 
participate in the ‘Friends of Syria’ conference. “Our best decision is to disassociate Lebanon 
from the developments in Syria”, reiterated Prime Minister Miqati;32 his position was reinforced 
with the French and American ‘understanding’ of the government’s position.33 However, these 
moves have not been popular across the spectrum of Lebanese society – that is, the opposition 
and a large portion of the Lebanese population – not the least for humanitarian reasons. Druze 
leader Walid Jumblat, although part of the current government, has consistently condemned 
Assad’s regime and called to intensify assistance to Syrian refugees.34 The scene in Lebanon is 
nuanced and complex and the dividing lines are unclear, but it is not the purpose of this paper 
to develop this aspect further. Nevertheless, it is worth to note that March 14th has taken an 
opposite stance. For Sunni leader former PM Saad Hariri, the Lebanese have ‘a national duty 
and a responsibility’ to stand by the Syrian people. Furthermore, as he noted that the regime in 
Syria is “engaged in the last battle to defend a regional axis”, he called on the international 
community and Arab countries to “take practical steps beyond condemnation, and even 
beyond imposing economic sanctions”.35 His alliance recognised the Syrian National Council 
“as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people”.36 March 14th alliance is very optimistic as 
to the fall of the Syrian regime. Hariri believes that “the establishment of a pluralistic 
democratic system in Syria will give great immunity to the Lebanese democratic experience”. 
The head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, agrees; it “means a stable Lebanon that has 
demarcated borders and its arms limited to the state (…) a democratic regime in Syria supports 
Lebanon’s independence”.37 However, Amal and Hezbollah, the two main Shiite parties, do 
not agree; they have accused the international community of targeting Syria because of its 
support to the Palestinian and the Lebanese resistance. 38 Furthermore, Hezbollah is convinced 
that March 14th’s manoeuvring is aimed at changing the domestic distribution of power.39 There 
are now two opposite but concrete directions taken by the two camps; this further reduces 
chances for near-term pacification and stabilisation.  
In brief, all parties were initially excited about the ‘Arab spring’. Categorisation and the 
sectarian narrative are both too simplistic and reductionist a method, but mainstream 
assumptions identify Sunni-Shia tension as a standing issue;40 therefore, the Syrian events, and 
to a lesser extent those in Bahrain, have received contradictory responses. 41  In addition, 
Christians have expressed some concerns over unintended repercussions of the ‘Arab spring’.42 
However, there have also been many reassurances. Hariri43 and Nasrallah44 reiterated their 
keenness for civil peace,45 and both singled out a common foreign enemy but no domestic one. 
This said, it is also noteworthy that both camps continue to slam each other as the Syrian events 
magnify the political rift.46 And, in the face of regional changes, perceptions of identity threats 
are spreading. 
Manifestat ions 
The heightened political tension has manifested itself on the ground through a number of 
security incidents. Since the start of the uprisings, a number of demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations have been staged and have gone through peacefully. However, in the south, 
Tyre has been the site a number of bomb explosions; the UNIFIL force was targeted, a 
number of rockets were launched into northern Israel thus threatening the cessation of 
hostilities, and the Palestinian camps have witnessed a number of serious armed clashes. 47 On 
the north-eastern borders, arms smuggling has raised concerns over the role that Lebanese and 
non-Lebanese factions could be playing in the Syrian crisis; the Defence Minister’s warning that 
al-Qaeda members have crossed over to Syria has raised fury.48 Whether and to what extent 
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these incidents were orchestrated one cannot say; nevertheless, compounded with a divisive 
and accusatory rhetoric,49 a large part of the population is increasingly mobilised along what 
seem like apocalyptic lines.  
Meanwhile, calls – such as Ayman al-Zawahiri’s – for Muslims to support the Syrian revolution 
have received concerns despite initially questioning the timing and the possible role the Syrian 
intelligence might have had in them.50 His call and others like it – including domestic ones – 
seem to have resonated in some Sunni circles. This is attributed to a number of reasons: one, 
because of the proximity of some of the Syrian rebel cities to Lebanese territory; two, because 
political and sectarian affiliations match most of the Lebanese northern border area; three, 
because cross-border activity has been an integral part of the formal and informal economies of 
the two border areas; four, because the historical conflict between the Sunnis and the Alawites 
in Tripoli has repeatedly escalated into armed clashes; five, because the increased spread of 
weapons amongst the various Lebanese factions as well as the Palestinian camps, and its flow to 
Syria constitute further challenges to the control of the use of force. Hence, the north of 
Lebanon, in particular, is mirroring a flared version of the domestic and regional political 
polarisation. Fears that Syrian instability is spilling further into Lebanon have been escalating. 
“Residents [are] increasingly seeing themselves as part of the conflict”;51 in Tripoli, anti-Assad 
Sunnis and pro-Assad Alawites fought several rounds of armed battles along what is 
conveniently called ‘Syria Street’.52 Furthermore, earlier in 2012, a special report by al-Akhbar 
newspaper investigated border cities such as Wadi Khaled used as a safe house for the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA).53 The issue of weapons and fighters crossing borders, Syrian incursions into 
Lebanese territory, cross-border fighting, safe-havens for Syrian rebels, Syrian refugees,54 the 
disappearance of a number of Syrian opposition figures, the kidnapping of Lebanese in Syria, 
and the extension of security events and clashes to various other parts of the country – 
including Beirut, Sidon and the Palestinian camps – are all part of the polemic. Both blocks, 
March 8th and 14th, have called for the deployment of the army along the Lebanese borders. 
The request by the former is aimed at preventing arms smuggling, fighters crossing and using 
Lebanon as a ‘launchpad’,55 while the latter’s request aims at protecting refugees, defectors, the 
FSA and preventing further incursions.56 Meanwhile, as mentioned, at the grassroots level, 
sectarian tension is sweltering: Sunni circles increasingly speak of their forced subordination to 
a Syrian and a Hezbollah-led government,57 and have expressed their resentment towards the 
“humiliation of the Sunni communities”.58 The failure of the state or even the opposition to 
respond to their grievances and to protect ‘their’ rights has encouraged groups to move towards 
more organised responses and, in some cases, to take matters into their hands. 59  The 
emergence of this third actor has presented a new challenge to the political elite—one they are 
struggling to control. The ensuing instability has allowed for a kidnapping spree to emerge and 
for a return to road-side bombings; state institutions are clearly overwhelmed; in response, a 
security plan here, deployment there, the use of good offices etc., have been among the 
patchwork measures employed. Domestic actors, the international community and the media 
have moved to warn against the further spill-over of the Syrian war on Lebanon; some have 
even gone as far as to re-introduce the term ‘civil-war’ into the discourse.60 Nevertheless, thus 
far, the traditional approach to ‘consensual security’61 has managed to keep the lid on the 
security flare-ups, and many domestic actors dismiss and challenge the media’s usage of the 
ghost of the civil war. 
Alternative Voices 
As events are unfolding, and amid fears that the Syrian crisis further exacerbates Lebanese 
politics and security, there have been calls to renew dialogue between the two camps. The 
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Muslim-Christian Summit urged, to quote, “officials in Lebanon to be in agreement for the 
sake of peace and stability in Lebanon and the unity of the people”, and it called “for a unified 
stance and a nationalistic rhetoric at a time when Lebanon and the region are going through 
these difficult and complicated times”.62 President Michel Suleiman has tried to bring the two 
sides back to negotiation, noting “Lebanon is in dire need for dialogue”.63 Sunni Grand Mufti 
Qabbani praised the president’s efforts to prevent further deterioration, noting that a return to 
dialogue would “boost trust and cooperation”.64And, Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi called 
for a “new National Pact to neutralize Lebanon”, stressing that the “advancement of Lebanon is 
a joint mission”.65  
While the Lebanese public seems to be divided along two broad lines, the reality is much more 
nuanced. There are voices trying to break free; left on their own, however, they might wither or 
be co-opted. Pockets of light can be seen in MP Tueini’s words: “it is time to start thinking of 
the rights of the individual ahead of the rights of minorities”.66 In a sense, Tueini is referring to 
human security concerns; but, despite enthusiasm over the ‘Cedar Revolution’, the Lebanese 
youth has not emulated its neighbours in standing up against socio-economic, development as 
well as political injustices. Instead, sectarian mobilisation continues as a manifestation of 
segregation, underdevelopment and manipulation.  
Having said this, one is also aware of positive grassroots efforts from outside the ruling 
establishment, which are worth considering. Matters of personal status in Lebanon fall under 
the jurisdiction of religious courts. With 18 recognised sects, there are 15 religious codes. A 
person only exists in Lebanon as a member of a sect. However, following a popular ‘National 
Campaign’ beginning in 2009, the Lebanese gained the right to remove their sect from their 
identity cards.67 An article in Now Lebanon captures sentiments shared by a growing number of 
Lebanese: “I’m here today to say that I am aware of what sect on ID means” said Nader Jaafar. 
The campaign, however, has not been received with much optimism: “some saw the move as 
purely symbolic, others saw it as the beginning of a wider change in Lebanese attitudes, 
conceding that it will take time for the full benefit to be felt”. Even this campaign was eventually 
politicised as groups affiliated with different coalitions refused to work together.68 
Another symbolic voice comes from the popular movement ‘Laique Pride March’.69 It is an 
annual march held since 2010 in protest against Lebanon’s sectarian system.70 As one journalist 
said, “you probably didn’t hear news of this demonstration, though”.71 A number of reasons can 
explain this: no violence ensued from either the state or demonstrators, and it did not represent 
any of the major and traditional parties, oligarchs or leaders. Although phrases such as 
‘revolution against the regime’ and ‘people want the fall of the regime’ were chanted, as in 
Egypt and elsewhere across the region,72 it was not seen as a threat to the ruling establishment. 
Reinventing Identi ty and Security  
Over the past few years, Lebanese society has been involved in many forms of resistance and 
protest, ranging from the peaceful to the armed and violent. However, authority and power in 
Lebanon are fragmented; therefore, aside from the Israeli occupation, the Lebanese have not 
had a centre to rally against. There has never, therefore, been a unified large-scale movement 
for change in Lebanon. 
Richard Wyn-Jones notes that identity is “a central aspect of the human experience”;73 and Ken 
Booth argues that “the issue of identity – what makes us believe we are the same and them 
different – is inseparable from security”.74 For most Lebanese, threats to identity or societal 
security75 are the main impediments to organised and wide-scale calls for change. Lebanese 
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society remains highly entrenched in a traditional security discourse that has monopolised 
Lebanese politics since and before independence. Despite widespread acceptance of the 
unsustainability of the system, Lebanese society remains subordinate to traditional leaders and 
imprisoned by a stringent identity discourse.  
Needless to say, a state as weak as the Lebanese one struggles in managing a common national 
identity when its legitimacy and its monopoly over the use of force are contingent on sectarian 
leaders. Although, as some claimed, “the very weakness of the centre has protected the country 
from replicating the regional unrest”,76 it could also be argued that this same weakness hampers 
genuine progress and replicates survivalist strategies and threat perceptions. 
May Chidiac77 said “today’s protests across the Arab world echo the spirit of the Lebanese 
model”; that is fair until she alluded that Lebanese, like “Arab youths have abandoned 
traditional ramblings… for legitimate demands: economic opportunities, political freedom, and 
an end to corruption and regime exclusivity”. Sadly, the day has not yet come where Lebanese 
youth put these ‘legitimate demands’ ahead of their sectarian and political affiliations. In the 
February 2005 demonstration, in a bid to showcase the diversity of groups taking part against 
the Syrian presence in Lebanon, “sending out ‘shout outs’ to the shiites, the Sunnites, the 
Druzes, the Maronites, and the Greek Orthodox Lebanese” was part of the rally.78 While 
noting that the masses remarkably and unprecedently rallied around a common cause, their 
identification remained sectarian, and when leaders diverged, so did the youth.  This 
divergence can be attributed to the construction that the different groups are a threat to each 
other’s existence, which in turn is hampering progress towards a common goal and identity.  
Fear or insecurity is not unjustified given the history of conflict in Lebanon. Nevertheless, it 
needs to be acknowledged that identities are social construct;79 they are ‘collective phenomena’ 
each of which is “created, negotiated, ascribed, and denied through interaction with others”;80 
and even though they seem to transcend other considerations, they are not the only value worth 
securing. 81   Although they seem structural and embedded in the system, they can be 
deconstructed and reconstructed, and eventually reinvented in an inclusive and comprehensive 
manner.82 Identities and security that hold the individual as their referent are the alternative; 
these are not individualistic, exclusivist or restrictive. Such an approach emphasises the 
reciprocity of rights and the reverence of the individual above all;83  and the individual is 
understood in the sense of the human being rather that ‘the man as such’.84 The corollary to 
this is that the security of other collectivities – society, groups, minorities and the state – can be 
guaranteed. Drawing from critical security studies, it is possible to put forth a vision of security 
that is deeper, wider, and non-deterministic. 
The role of international and regional powers is essential. The Lebanese cannot do it alone.85 
As in the Northern Ireland peace process and in European integration in the aftermath of 
WWII, they will require an enabling environment. 86   Instead, regional action has 
instrumentalised fears, and has intensified the pressure on the government’s stance.87 This has 
contributed to further polarisation and has highlighted the government’s failure to effectively 
cope with the crisis. Regional action has fed and contributed to the increasingly widespread 
perspective that the situation in Lebanon is volatile and heading towards an uncontrollable 
vacuum. There have been calls for domestic reconciliation, and the president’s visits to Gulf 
monarchies as well as the revival of the National Dialogue are meant to dissuade the boiling 
tension and buy time for the immediate regional situation to unfold; however these steps 
remain symbolic in light of the larger regional context.88 As long as regional and international 
powers do not support, push, finance, and provide the appropriate atmosphere to dissuade 
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tension, the Lebanese quest to climb out of the cycle of identity threats will remain a marginal 
effort. I should note that international pressure was instrumental in 2005 in pressuring Syria out 
of Lebanon. Subsequently, however, foreign intervention aggravated the rift between the 
Lebanese communities and created two opposing blocks contending for the future of Lebanon. 
A different type of regional and international role is required, therefore: not impositions or 
‘Chapter 7’ resolutions, not isolation or an ultimatum between a Western versus an Iranian axis, 
and not a widening of the divide between the two groups by setting them against each other. 
The strategy currently adopted is reminiscent of the Cold War – one of standoffs and proxies. 
It is unsustainable but unlikely to change in the near future. This study instead advises 
engagement, rapprochement, incentives and a common vision – ‘a seduction model’. 89 
Believing in the duality of identity and interest, Bill McSweeney argues that “it is idealistic to 
imagine individuals or collectivities, socialized by habit and history into a particular sense of self, 
will choose to change without the incentive or pressure of self-interest”. This ‘seduction model’ 
encourages actors into a ‘new school of learning’ to forge a ‘cooperation habit’ or a 
‘coordinated reflex’.90 A new strategy for Lebanon therefore needs to address deep rooted fears 
and identity threats, while identifying common interests and shared values for the purpose of 
reconstructing an inclusive common national identity.91 Nevertheless, as Lebanon is locked in 
the midst of a fierce regional and international showdown – even construed as an existential 
one – prospects of such a project remain slim. 
This being said, the domestic scene is dynamic, and there is room for continued effort at the 
individual, societal, and state levels. Some initiatives at the grass-roots level contribute to the 
positive transformation of society, making sure that the time is ripe for change and that the 
social infrastructure is receptive and capable of supporting a new vision for security. Eventually, 
it will rest on, not the state as such, but on individuals in the ruling establishment – sectarian, 
state, and social – to champion this cause, for it might be the least costly path to sustainable 
security. The most difficult task, however, is for the youth of Lebanon to liberate themselves 
from the grips of traditional sectarian and feudal leaders, and to recognise that their interests 
are intertwined. McSweeney notes that “security depends on how we choose our identity and 
interests”;92 the Lebanese can choose a more inclusive conception of security, based on a long-
term vision that their future is shared and their security mutually reinforcing and 
interdependent. Change can start through a bottom-up approach until leaders are convinced 
there is no safer or long-term alternative. This paper does not claim to suggest a detailed plan 
to overcome some of the structural and historical obstacles to stability in Lebanon; however, it 
does suggest that a “process by which participants (…) come together actively to transform it, 
and in the process transform themselves”,93 is highly desirable. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the Arab uprisings are exacerbating an already precarious 
situation by providing the two political camps in Lebanon with more reasons to ossify their 
positions. In light of the two camps’ fixation on political gains to secure their separate identities, 
the Lebanese system is unsustainable. The current situation prevents human security concerns 
such as development, access to justice, rule of law, social injustice and security from being 
addressed. Having said that, the Lebanese experience is not one to dismiss entirely; Lebanon 
remains the most democratic state in the region, with periodic elections, a relatively free media 
and an open opposition.94 Furthermore, the system has been flexible enough to thwart several 
near fatal relapses into civil war. 95  Those who are optimistic such as UK ambassador to 
Lebanon – Tom Fletcher – note that the Lebanese have shown resilience and are used to grey 
shades rather than black and white. 96 Another Western diplomat in Lebanon noted that the 
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Lebanese experience could be seen as “an enabler for the region rather than a disabler”.97 
Therefore, Lebanon’s power-sharing experience and its relatively consensus-based approach 
constitute a valuable base. As such, this paper contends that some of the pillars for cooperation 
and integration are there; now the Lebanese need to run the extra mile. 
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90 (Emphasis added). Ibid, pp. 172, 197, 210 
91 Deconstruction “expose[s] the contingency of all social arrangements, and the human choice and interests which 
gave rise to them, thereby advancing the possibility of constructing alternatives”. (Emphasis added). Ibid, p. 219. 
92 He stresses human agency and choice to defy determinism. Ibid, p. 214. 
93 Authors in this quote are referring to ‘emancipation’. Joseph Ruane and Jennyfer Todd, The Dynamics of 
Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
p. 15. 
94 Julia Choucair, Finding a Path from Deadlock to Democracy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2006), p. 3. 
95 Clashes associated with the Syrian events as well as with the lingering domestic divide have been largely 
contained. 
96 On December 30, 2011, the ambassador tweeted that despite the obstacles, he is optimistic that the “forces 
holding this unique country together” will remain strong. 
97 Personal interview, Beirut, January 2012. 
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those factors which can lead to insecurity within a country or region, to 
anticipate when aggression between or within states may occur, and to 
identify and learn how external powers and bodies such as the United 
Nations Security Council should respond appropriately. Research into 
such matters within the Programme at the University will yield 
immense benefit to state actors and non-state organisations alike on the 
world stage. The Programme aims to have an important, dynamic and 
lasting effect on decision making with respect to governance and the 
security of nations worldwide. 
The Programme is led by the Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah 
Chair who drives the research agenda of the Programme. The 
Programme also provides dedicated support for postgraduate and 
doctoral students in the area of international and regional security; 
organises international conferences and symposia; and aims, through its 
publication series, to disseminate the best new and innovative research 
and analysis on regional politics and related security matters. 
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